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Abstract
This paper confirms that a regime-switching model out-performs a linear VAR
model in terms of understanding the system dynamics of asset returns. Impulse
responses of REIT returns to either the federal funds rate or the interest rate spread
are much larger initially but less persistent. Furthermore, the term structure acts
as an amplifier of the impulse response for REIT return, a stabilizer for the housing
counterpart under some regime, and, perhaps surprisingly, almost no role for the
stock return. In contrast, GDP growth has very marginal eﬀect in the impulse
response for all assets.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between the monetary policy changes and the asset markets has at-
tracted a considerable attention in recent years. For instance, among central bankers and
scholars, Goodhart (2001), Bernanke and Gertler (2001) express very diﬀerent points of
view on whether the monetary policy should react to asset price movements. Perhaps
a more fundamental question is whether the monetary policy aﬀects the asset markets,
and if so, how and how much. Many studies have been devoted to these questions and
clearly it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the literature.1 To complement the
literature, this paper focus on investigating the impact of changes in the Federal Funds
Rate (henceforth FFR) on the returns of house prices and Equity Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), respectively.2 To diﬀerentiate from previous research eﬀorts, this paper
explicitly introduces two elements in the empirical model: (1) the term structure (or, the
interest rate spread, or the slope of the yield curve) and (2) the regime-switching nature
of the dynamical system.
The justifications of including the interest rate spread in the empirical model are
easy to see. It is well known that the term structure contains information about future
inflation, future real economic activities as well as asset returns.3 Thus, it may be
instructive to include the term structure as a (partly) “forward-looking variable” in the
regression without taking any stand on the formation of future inflation or interest rate
expectation.4 Furthermore, theoretically, asset returns and particularly real estate related
assets returns, should respond at least as much to the long-term interest rate (or, the
long rate) as to the short-term interest rate (or, the short rate). Yet typically central
1Among others, see Cochrane (2001, 2005), Goodhart and Hofmann (2007) and the reference therein.
2By regulation, REITs are required to invest at least 75% of their assets in real estate and pay the
minimum 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends (Chan et al. (2003)).
3This statement has been confirmed by the data of the U.S. as well as other advanced countries.
Among others, see Campbell (1987), Chen (1991), Fama (1990), Ferson (1989), Plosser and Rouwenhorst
(1994), Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and the reference therein. For a
review of the more recent literature, see Estrella (2005), Estrella and Turbin (2006), among others.
4In the literature of term structure, a lot of eﬀorts have been devoted to verify the “expectation
hypothesis.” However, Collin-Dufresne (2004) shows that there are several versions of the expectation
hypothesis and they are not consistent with one another. Thus, the explicit formulation of the expecta-
tion may matter to the final empirical result.
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banks can only influence the short rate directly. Thus, the transmission mechanism of
how a monetary policy change leads to the asset market reactions in the presence of an
endogenously adjusted term structure can be very interesting. In fact, it is also related to
the monetary economics literature. Many studies have shown that money is “neutral” in
the long run, in the sense that money growth will eventually be matched with proportional
price growth (i.e. inflation).5 Thus, if the central banks cut the short rate and increase
the nominal money supply permanently, it may decrease the cost of capital in the short
run. At the same time, however, the long run inflation expectation would increase, which
in turn push up the long rate. With the short rate decreases and the long rate increases,
the interest rate spread would increase, and hence the asset return and real economic
activity would be aﬀected. This may be considered as an indirect eﬀect of the monetary
policy. We will have further discussion on this point later.
The modelling of the regime switching process can be easily justified as well. It has
long been aware that economic time series may be characterized by a Markov regime-
switching process, rather than a smooth ARMA process. For instance, Hamilton (1989)
shows that the aggregate output in the United States can be characterized by such
a process.6 Regime-switching models have since then been widely used in modelling
diﬀerent classes of asset prices, including stock, option, foreign exchange, interest rate,
etc. (among others, see Cai (1994), Bollen et al. (2000), Cheung and Erlandsson (2005),
Driﬃll and Sola (1998), Duan et al. (2002), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), Hansen and
Poulsen (2000), Lizieri and Satchell (1997)). The literature also suggest that there are
significant diﬀerence between the REITs listed in the 1990s and those listed before,
including the liquidity, size, the degree of focus by property type, financing policy, capital
structure, etc. (among others, see Beneveniste et al. (2001), Capozza and Seguin (1998,
1999), Chan et al. (2003), Ott et al. (2005)). Finally, the conduct of monetary policy has
changed over time along diﬀerent chairmanship of the Fed and during several dramatic
episodes of aggregate shocks. In this paper, our dynamical system follows a regime-
switching process, which nests the usual case of single regime as a special case. It enables
5Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review this large literature. See King and Watson
(1994, 1997) and the reference therein.
6Since Hamilton (1989), there is a large literature on applying regime-switching process in economics
and finance research. For a review of the literature, see Hamilton (1994), among others.
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us to formally test whether the process should be characterized by a single-regime process
or a regime-switching one. In addition, it also nests the typical structural break model,
where the system can only change the regime once, as another special case.
In terms of the asset markets, this paper would focus on the responses of equity
REIT and housing. As a comparison, we will also present the results of stock return
in a later section. The importance of REITs has been rapidly increasing in the last
twenty years. The increasing securitization of real estate assets has led the total market
capitalization of REITs jumped from around $09 billion in 1975 to $312 billion in 2007.7
In particular, as Figure 1 shows, the market capitalization of equity REITs has gained
considerable importance in recent years and accounts for more than 90% of total REITs
since 1997. Hence, this paper would focus on the equity REIT. As more and more Asian
countries (including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong) are developing their
REIT markets, the experience of the U.S. REIT market can also serve as an important
benchmark for both the academics and policy makers in these Asian countries.8
(Figure 1 about here)
Comparison of the returns between REIT and other assets is not new in the literature.
Among others, Glascock et al. (2002), Chan et al. (2005), show that REIT behave more
like stocks and less like bonds after early 1990s. This paper builds on their insights and
attempts to compare the two returns from a diﬀerent angle. It is not diﬃcult to see that
monetary policy can aﬀect the return of REIT. Interest rate changes may influence how
investors discount the value of future cash flows or service flows, and hence the value of
real estate assets, commercial real estate (the typical underlying portfolio of REIT) as
well as housing. In fact, Chan et al. (2003) decompose the total return of REIT and
find that “dividend return” is pretty stable and most of the fluctuations come from the
“capital gain return.”
7According to Datastream, the total US stock market capitalization (“TOTMKUS” which comprises
of top 80% of companies in US) is around 15519.84 billion at the end of 2007. Thus, the total market
capitalization of REITs in 2007 accounts for around 2% of the total US stock market capitalization. See
also Chan et al. (2003).
8Among others, see Ong et al. (2008) and the reference therein.
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On the other hand, there are fundamental diﬀerences in the returns on the housing
markets (which is a private real estate) and equity REITs (which is a public real estate).
For example, most “investors” in the housing market in the United States are individuals
who are typically also the occupiers. A very significant share of their wealth are tied to the
value of the house. In contrast, typical investors of REIT are institutional investors and
they may have a diﬀerent preferences for REITs.9 Furthermore, house price returns are
based on residential housing market price index, while the underlying assets of REITs are
mostly commercial real estates such as oﬃce buildings, shopping centers, and warehouses.
Due to these diﬀerences, the reactions of REIT return and housing return may indeed be
very diﬀerent. Figure 2 plots the returns of equity REITs and the housing market over
time. It is clear that the volatility of equity REITs returns are much larger than that
of housing market returns. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the four variables
under investigation, which are the Federal Funds Rates (), the housing market
returns ( ), the rate of return on equity REITs ( ), and the interest rate
spread ().10 Notice that the standard deviation of equity REITs returns are seven
times more than that of housing market returns during the sampling period. In addition,
the skewness (in absolute value) for both the term spread and the housing return is above
0.56. The skewness of federal fund rate is even above unity. In addition, the kurtosis
of the federal fund rate is above four. All these seem to suggest that a single-regime
linear VAR with normally distributed error term might not be able to fit the data very
well, and we might need a non-linear econometric model to explain this data set.11 Table
2 shows that the correlation coeﬃcient of these two returns are only slightly positively
correlated.
(Figure 2 about here)
(Table 1, 2 about here)
Next, the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy may be diﬀerent in the REIT
9For instance, see Ciochetti et al. (2002) for empirical evidence. Wang et al. (1995) find that REIT
stock with higher percentages of institutional investors tend to perform better.
10Throughout this paper, we use nominal return. More discussion on this will be presented in the
data section.
11Among others, see Bond and Patel (2003) for further analysis of the higher moment of real estate
return.
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versus housing market.12 Finally, even within the same market, the response to the
monetary policy under diﬀerence states of the economy may be diﬀerent. All these may
lead to significantly diﬀerent response in housing market returns in comparison with
REIT returns to changes in monetary policy.
It may be instructive to preview some of the results, which indeed show that the REIT
return and housing return behave diﬀerently. First, the contemporaneous eﬀect of the
spread on either REIT returns or housing market returns is higher than that of federal
funds rate in the high volatility regime, but the opposite occurs in the low volatility
regime, suggesting that the direct and indirect eﬀect of monetary policy are regime-
dependent. Second, the contemporaneous eﬀect on REIT returns, either from federal
funds rate or the spread, is much larger than the eﬀect on housing market returns. Third,
the impulse responses of REIT returns to either federal funds rate or the spread are much
larger initially but less persistent than the responses of housing market returns. Fourth, in
response to an innovation in federal funds rate, the responses of housing market returns in
the high-volatility regime and the low-volatility one are very diﬀerent from those of REIT
returns. In particular, REIT returns decline substantially in high volatility regime much
more than in the low regime, while the responses of housing market returns are smaller
in the high volatility regime than in the low regime and in general much smaller than
those of REIT returns. Finally, the spread plays a very diﬀerent role in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in aﬀecting REITs returns and housing market returns:
the spread acts as an amplifier for the former, while a stabilizer for the latter under some
regime. These findings may carry important implications to the conduct of monetary
policy and the reactions of the asset markets. More discussion will be followed.
To tie up more closely with the literature, we produce two more sets of results. First,
we repeat the exercise with the stock market return. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that
the interest rate spread plays no role in the transmission of monetary policy shock to the
stock market return. It means that even though REIT is being traded in the financial
market, it is still fundamentally diﬀerent from stocks due to its very nature. In addition,
12For example, the impact of policy rate changes on the equity market aﬀects the expected level of
future dividends of the firms which can be paid out as dividends for REITs; however, real estate related
assets resturns should be responding to long-term rate more than to short-term rate, via the influence
on general economic activity that feeds through to the demand in the underlying real estate market.
6
we extend our structural VAR system to include the real GDP growth. Most results
concerning the asset returns remain unchanged. It demonstrates the robustness of our
previous results. It may also have interesting policy implications. We will delay the
discussion on these issues to later sections.
Clearly, our paper is related to several strands of literature studying the eﬀect of
monetary policy on asset returns and the role of term spread in the transmission of
monetary policy. Many works have studied the eﬀect of interest rate variables on the
real estate returns. The results from literature seem to be mixed and may suggest some
non-linearity. For instance, McCue and Kling (1994) find that interest rates have a very
significant influence on equity REIT returns net of stock market influences with a VAR
structure. On the other hand, Mueller and Pauley (1995) find insignificant eﬀects on
REIT prices from changes in the short and long-term interest rates either in periods
when interest rates are high or low. Bredin et al. (2007) find a strong response in both
the first and second moments of REIT returns to unexpected federal funds rate changes.
Lizieri and Satchell (1997) adopt a threshold autoregressive methodology and find that
the relationship between the real rate of interest and property company stock prices for
UK is sensitive to high interest and low interest rate regimes. Similarly, a number of
papers have shown that the sensitivity of REITs to interest rates is both time-varying
and also dependent on the rate used. He et al. (2003) also confirm previous findings
showing that REITs are most sensitive to changes in long-term yields and low-grade
corporate bonds, and these responses are also time-varying. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)
also find that the short rate and the spread have very diﬀerent impact on the housing
prices in a cross-country study. Our paper complements the literature by explicitly takes
into consideration of the possibility of regime-switching,13 and how the term spread would
aﬀect diﬀerent asset returns, with an extended data set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric
model and gives a statistical summary of the data. Section 3 presents the empirical
estimation results with the baseline model, which includes the federal funds rate, interest
rate spread, and returns, where the returns is either the REIT returns or the housing
market returns. Section 4 conducts a counterfactual analysis by shutting oﬀ the channel
13It includes the Hamilton (1989) regime switching model, and the test on the stationarity test for
regime-switching model developed by Francq and Zakoian (2001).
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of spread. We also consider a four-variable model, by adding GDP, as a robustness
check. Section 5 considers stock returns, as a comparison with REIT returns. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Econometric Analysis
2.1 Data
To be comparable to the literature, we employ the U.S. data for our analysis. Since the
house price index is available only in quarterly data, other variables originally available
in monthly are transformed into quarterly, covering the period of 19751 − 20081.
The basic model includes only 4 variables, which are ,  ,  , and .
Notice that throughout this paper, nominal returns are used.14 If we use real asset return,
we would need to add the inflation rate as an additional variable. Due to the regime-
switching nature of the model, the number of parameters to be estimated will significantly
increase and will be a burden given our limited dataset.15 Also, the inflation rate would
be correlated to the short rate and the long rate, which means that adding the inflation
rate in the system could create some degree of multicollinearity. More importantly,
to calculate the interest spread in real terms, we will need some independent measure
for long term inflation expectation, which does not seem to be available. In fact, the
literature tend to use the interest rate spread to “extract” long term inflation expectation.
Therefore, our benchmark is to have a three-variable system, , , and one of
the real estate return ( or  ). Since asset returns tend to adjust faster than
other macroeconomic variables, such as output or capital stock, it may be instructive to
focus on a system with only asset returns.16
14Some recent studies of housing market also use nominal prices and returns instead of the real ones,
including Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Hott and Monnin (2008), among others.
15In spite of this, we will introduce more variables in the analysis in some later sections.
16The idea that some markets can adjust faster than other markets is not new. See Arrow and Hahn
(1971) for a review of the earlier theoretical literature. In addition, asset prices may be more forward-
looking than the macroeconomic variables. We will come back to this point in some later sections. See
also Dornbusch (1976) for an illustration in the context of an open economy.
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In terms of data construction, the short-term policy rate, i.e. , is taken from
H.15 statistical release (“Selected Interest Rates”) issued by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. We compute the  from the housing price index which is taken from the
Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The  is taken from the
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). For the spread ,
we follow Estrella and Trubin (2006) by choosing the spread between ten-year Treasury
bond yield and three-month Treasury bill rate, and both are released by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors.17 As for the 3-month Treasury bill rate, since the constant
maturity rates are available only after 1982, we use the secondary market three-month
rate expressed on a bond-equivalent basis.18 Estrella and Trubin (2006) argue that this
spread provides an accurate and robust measure in predicting U.S. real activity over long
periods of time. Figure 2 plots the time series for these four variables.
As shown by Table 1, the equity REIT returns has about the same mean with the
housing market returns, but has a much higher volatility than the housing market returns.
The simple correlation coeﬃcients displayed in Table 2 shows that only the federal funds
rate is significantly and negatively correlated with the spread, which is around−055. The
housing market returns are only mildly positively correlated with equity REIT returns.
Other pairwise correlation coeﬃcients are in generally low. A more careful investigation
of the data will show that these variables are indeed significantly related, and the tool
that we employ will be explained in the next section.
2.2 The Econometric Model
The econometric model is simple. The structural form of time varying vector autoregres-
sion model with lag length  for a process :
0 =  +1−1 +2−2 + +− +  (1)
For a survey of the sluggish adjustment in the goods market and the labor market, see Taylor (1999),
among others.
17Treasury securities are also useful because they are not subject to significant credit risk premiums
that may change with maturity and over time.
18The 3-month secondary market T-bill rate provided by the Federal Reserve System is on a discount
basis. We follow Estrella and Trubin (2006) by converting the three-month discount rate () to a
bond-equivalent rate ():  = 365×100
360−91×100 × 100.
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where we allow for all parameters, including intercept coeﬃcients, autoregressive coeﬃ-
cients, and covariance matrix of stochastic terms to be contingent on the unobservable
state variable  ∈  (to ease the burden of the notations, we suppress the state-dependent
subscripts). Vector autoregression model is chosen because it imposes (relatively) less
presumptions on the data structure, and it also conveniently parameterize the dynamic
interactions within a system.19 The time varying coeﬃcients capture possible nonlinear-
ities or time variation in the lag structure of the model. The stochastic volatility allows
for possible heteroskedasticity of the stochastic terms.
The variables of interest  = (1 2  )0 is a×1 vector. The stochastic inter-
cept term  = (1 ()  2 ()    ())0 captures the diﬀerence in the intercept under
diﬀerent states. 0 is a × state-dependent matrix which measures the contempora-
neous relationship between variables and the econometric identification of the model is
obtained through restrictions on 0.  is a × matrix with each element which is
state-dependent () (),   = 1   = 1  . The stochastic error term  will be
explained below.
The corresponding reduced form of the above model can be obtained by pre-multiplying (1)
by −10 , which yields:
 = + Φ1−1 + Φ2−2 + + Φ− +  (2)
where  = −10 , Φ = −10 , and  = −10 ,  = 1 2 . Φ is a × matrix with
each element which is state-dependent () (),   = 1   = 1  . We further
define  () ≡  +  (), which will be explained below. The vector of stochastic error
term  can be further expressed as
 = −10  = Λ ()12 () 
where  is a × diagonal matrix with diagonal elements 2 ,  = 1 , Λ () is a
× diagonal matrix with diagonal elements  (),  = 1 ,
Λ () =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 () 0 · · · 0
0 2 () · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · ·  ()
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

19Among others, see Sims (1980) for more discussion on these issues and the potential biases that
could be eliminated by the VAR method.
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which captures the diﬀerence in the intensity of volatility, and  () is a vector of stan-
dard normal distribution,  () ∼  (0Σ ()), where the covariance matrix is given
by
Σ () =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 21 () · · · 1 ()
12 () 1 · · · 2 ()
...
...
. . .
...
1 () 2 () · · · 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 (3)
In this paper, we consider a three-variate time varying  () model, i.e.,  = 3.
The three variables of interest are  = (  )0, where  denotes the
federal funds rate,  is the interest rate spread, and  denotes either REIT returns
( ) or housing market return ( ).
Given these three variables, we impose restrictions on the elements of 0 according
to theoretical considerations as an identification scheme of the model. 0 is specified to
be a lower triangular matrix:
0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
210 () 1 0
220 () 230 () 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  (4)
As shown in (4), we have imposed a recursive restriction so that 1 () aﬀects 2
(), and both 1 and 2 aﬀect 3 ( ) contemporaneously, but not vice versa.
On the other hand, it is still possible for  to aﬀect  and  but with a time
lag. Thus, the restriction may not be as stringent as it seems.
2.3 Two-state Markov Process
Following the literature of Markov Switching, and being limited by the sample size, we
assume that there are only two states, i.e.,  ∈  = {1 2}. The procedure of the
identification of the regime of the economy for a given period will be discussed below.
The Markov switching process relates the probability that regime  prevails in  to the
prevailing regime  in −1, ( =  | −1 = ) = . The transition probability matrix
is then given by:
 =
⎛
⎝ 11 1− 11
1− 22 22
⎞
⎠ 
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The persistence can be measured by the duration 1(1 − ), and hence the higher the
value of , the higher the level of persistence.
Given that the economy can be either in state 1 or state 2, the term  ()   =
1 , defined above, captures the diﬀerence in the intercept under diﬀerent states. For
convenience, we set  (1) = 0 for  = 1, thus  (2) measures the diﬀerence in the
intercept between state 2 and state 1. Furthermore, we set the diagonal element of Λ ()
at state 1 to be unity, i.e.,  (1) = 1 so that if  (2)  1, then the intensity of volatility
in state 2 is larger than that in state 1, and vice versa.
Since  () is a vector of standard normal distribution and  (1) is set to be one,
the variance of   = 1 , at state 1 is 2 , and the variance is 2 (2)2 .
2.4 Identification of Regimes
Finally, we discuss the identification of regimes in this model. Since the state of the
economy is unobservable, we identify the regime for given a time period by Hamilton’s
(1989, 1994) smoothed probability approach, in which the probability of being state 
at time  is given by  ( | Ω ), where Ω = {1 2    }. The idea is that we
identify the state of the economy from an ex post point of view, and thus the full set
of information is utilized. Notice that we only allow for two regimes in this paper, i.e.,
 ∈  = {1 2}. Thus, if  ( =  | Ω )  05, then we identify the economy most likely
to be in state ,  = 1 2.
2.5 Stationarity of Markov Regime Switching Model
The stationarity test of Markov regime switching model is provided by Francq and Za-
koian (2001). To illustrate the idea, take a  (2) model as an example. Let
Γ () =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Φ1 () Φ2 () 03
3 03 03
03 03 03
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
where 3 is a 3 × 3 identity matrix, 03 is 3 × 3 null matrix, and Φ1 () and Φ2 () are
the autoregression matrices in (2). We then define the following matrix
Ξ =
⎡
⎣ 11 × (Γ (1)⊗ Γ (1)) 21 × (Γ (1)⊗ Γ (1))
12 × (Γ (2)⊗ Γ (2)) 22 × (Γ (2)⊗ Γ (2))
⎤
⎦  (5)
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and let  (Ξ) be the spectral radius of Ξ. Francq and Zakoian (2001) show that a suﬃcient
condition for second-order stationarity of a Markov switching  (2) model is  (Ξ)  1.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Equity REIT Returns
We first examine the impact and transmission of monetary policy on equity REIT re-
turns. To begin with, we consider the model selection problem. Recall that in the model
(2), we allow for all parameters, including intercepts ( ()), autoregressive coeﬃcients
(Φ ()), volatilities and correlation coeﬃcients of stochastic terms (Λ () and  ()),
to be state-contingent. We first examine whether this model is indeed better than al-
ternative specifications. We compare the model based on Akaike’s information criterion
() with other three specifications: (A) only  () and Λ () are state-contingent;
(B) only  (), Λ (), and  () are state-contingent; and (C) only  (), Φ (), and
Λ () are state-contingent. The model (2) is labeled as model (D). Together with the
single-regime model where all parameters are non-state-contingent, the results are sum-
marized in Table 3. It is clear that, with lag period chosen to be one ( = 1), model D,
i.e., (2), is the best for having the lowest value of . In the following we report only
the estimation results of the single-regime model and the best-performing model (2).
(Table 3 about here)
To see whether the choice of lag period  = 1 is justified, we will perform two tests.
First, we test for the autocorrelation of the residuals. The LM tests reported in Table
4 suggests that the residuals of  (1), for both single-regime model and Markov-
switching model, cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are white noise.
This result increases the credibility of our model.
(Table 4 about here)
Second, we test for the dynamic stationarity of our Markov switching  (1) model
using the method proposed by Francq and Zakoian (2001). We calculate the spectral
radius of Ξ specified in (5) and the result shows that  (Ξ) = 0919  1. This says that
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our Markov switching  (1) model is second-order stationary. Thus, we will proceed
the estimation and conduct the impulse responses with the  (1).
Table 5 reports estimation results of the three-variate SVAR (  )
under single-regime model and the Markov switching model (2). Many coeﬃcients are
statistically significant, providing support to the validity of the model. It also shows
that the performance of the regime-switching model is superior to the linear VAR model
through the log-likelihood ratio.
(Table 5 about here)
For the Markov switching model, recall that we set the volatility at regime 1  (1) = 1,
thus the element  (2) measures the relative volatility of regime 2 over regime 1. From
Table 5, we can see that the estimated values of relative volatility  (2) are significantly
less than one for  = 1 and 2, which means that for both federal funds rate and the spread
the volatility in regime 2 is lower than in regime 1. On the other hand, 3 (2) is larger
than one, but statistically insignificant, which suggests that for the REIT returns there
is no significant diﬀerence in volatility across regimes. Specifically, the value of variance
of the federal funds rate is 2659 (21) in regime 1 and 0241 (21×21 (2)). For the spread,
they are 0902 in regime 1 and 0203 in regime 2. For the REIT returns, it is 36089 in
regime 1 and 45838 in regime 2. Thus, no matter which regime, REIT returns has the
highest volatility.
Figure 3 plots the estimated smoothed probabilities for regime 1 and 2 respectively.
The left panel shows the probabilities of the economy being in regime 1 (i.e. high volatility
regime) at a given period. The right panel mirrors the left panel, showing the probabilities
of being in regime 2.
(Figure 3 about here)
The Markov switching model here identifies two regimes for this monetary policy
tool: a high volatility regime (regime 1) and a low volatility regime (regime 2). The
high volatility regime accounts for 2045% of the total sample periods, while the latter
7955%. Based on these two regimes, only the period 19783 − 19851 is identified as
the high volatility regime (regime 1).20 This period coincided with the aftermath of the
20One may be tempted to remove the data prior to 1985Q2 and thus focus on a single-regime case.
First, we did not know the high volatility regime is concentrated in one period (1978Q3- 1985Q1). Second,
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first and the second oil crises, and P. Volcker being appointed as Chairman of the Federal
Reserve.21
The transition probability matrix is estimated to be
=
⎛
⎝ 11 12
21 22
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ 0956 0044
0009 0991
⎞
⎠ 
which means that both regimes are actually very persistent. In other words, it may not
be easy to predict the timing of the regime-change.
The matrix 0 measuring the contemporaneous relationship between variables for the
single-regime model is estimated to be
0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
05309 1 0
31235 39404 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  (6)
The estimated result of 0 can then be more conveniently expressed as the following to
show the contemporaneous eﬀects among variables,
 = 0×  + 0× + 
 = −05309×  + 0× + 
 = −31235×  − 39404×  + 
This says that the spread contemporaneously declines by 05309% for one percent increase
in the federal funds rate, and the contemporaneous eﬀect of spread on REIT returns
(39404%) is higher than that of federal funds rate on REIT returns (31235%).
the early period (1975Q2- 1978Q2) still belongs to the regime 2. If we remove all the data before 1985Q2,
the estimation of the regime 2 parameters will become less precise, some may even be mis-labelled as
insignificant. Perhaps more importantly, as we will see in the next section, the high-volatility regime for
housing return is very diﬀerent from that of the REIT. Thus, it may still be wise to use the full sample to
estimate the regime-switching model, rather than to artifically cut oﬀ some earlier periods and estimate
a linear VAR model.
21Among others, Goodfriend and King (2005), Goodfriend (2007) provides a summary of the history
of monetary policy during that period.
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As for the regime switching model, the regime-dependent transition matrices for
regime 1 and 2 are the following,
0(1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
04927 1 0
41106 54990 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , 0(2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
05995 1 0
43389 41928 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  (7)
There is an interesting diﬀerence between these two models. A comparison of (6)
and (7) reveals that the contemporaneous eﬀect of the spread higher than that of federal
funds rate on REIT returns which we found in the single-regime model occurs here only in
regime 1 (high volatility regime), i.e., 54990% over 41106%. In regime 2 (low volatility
regime), on the contrary, the contemporaneous eﬀect of the spread on REIT returns
(41928%) is lower than that of federal funds rate on REIT returns (43389%) .
We then conduct impulse responses for the  (1) model. Throughout this paper,
as in many papers, the vertical axis measures the percentage change of the variable
relative to its own steady state value. The convention is that a value of unity means
100% of its steady state value. In Figure 4, the solid line represents results from single
regime model, and two dotted lines represent results when the economy is in regime 1
(high volatility), and regime 2 (low volatility). An immediate observation is that the
dynamics of impulse responses in high volatility regime are much more volatile than that
in low volatility regime. Next, for either regime 1 or regime 2, REIT returns respond
to innovations in spread more strongly initially but less persistent than innovations in
federal funds rate. Also, under the low volatility regime, which constitutes about 80% of
the sampling period, the impulse response of the REIT return to an innovation in REIT
return itself quickly dies out in 2 quarters, which seems to be consistent with the view
that the REIT market is very eﬃcient in “digesting and absorbing” the news of itself.
(Figure 4 about here)
3.2 Housing Market Returns
We now turn to the impact and transmission of monetary policy on housing market
returns. Again, we first consider the model selection problem. As before, we compare
the general model (2) with other alternatives with lag period chosen to be one ( = 1)
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and two ( = 2). Table 6 reports the results. It is clear that the model (2) with a lag
period of  = 2, labeled Model , is the best for having the lowest value of .
(Table 6 about here)
As in the case of REIT, we will use two tests to justify the choice of lag period  = 2
As in the case of REIT return, we first test for the autocorrelation of the residuals. For
both the single-regime model and Markov-switching model, the LM tests reported in
Table 7 suggest that the residuals of  (2) cannot reject he null hypothesis that the
residuals are white noise. Now we test for its dynamic stationarity by computing the
spectral radius of Ξ specified in (5). We find  (Ξ) = 0888  1, which says that the
model is second-order stationary.
(Table 7 about here)
Table 8 reports estimation results of the three-variate SVAR ( )
under single-regime model and the Markov switching model (2). Again, it shows that
the Markov switching model performs better. The estimated values of relative volatility
 (2) are significantly less than one for all  (in fact, they are numerically less than 03),
meaning that for the volatilities of all three variables under regime 2 are significantly
lower. In terms of the absolute magnitude, the volatility of housing market returns are
far less than those of REIT returns.22
(Table 8 about here)
The left panel of Figure 5 plots the estimated smoothed probabilities for regime 1 (i.e.
the high-volatility regime) and the right panel shows the probabilities of being in regime
2 (i.e. the low-volatility regime). The high volatility regime accounts for 2197% of the
total sample periods, a little bit higher than the previous subsection. Three time periods
are identified as having high volatilities: 19752 − 19754, 19794 − 19844, and
19872− 19882. The second time period (19794− 19844) closely overlaps with the
period identified as high volatility regime when REIT returns was under investigation
22The value of variance of the federal funds rate is 2343 (21) in regime 1 and 0111 (21 ×21 (2)). For
the spread, they are 1050 in regime 1 and 0088 in regime 2. Finally, the housing market returns is
0464 (23) in regime 1 and 0390 ((23 × 23 (2)) in regime 2.
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(19783 − 19851). Yet housing returns and REIT returns are diﬀerent. The REIT
returns display low volatility in the other two periods for housing returns to display high
volatility. The first one (19752 − 19754) was related to the aftermath of the first
oil crisis, and the third one (19872 − 19882) coincided with the 1987 stock market
crash.23
(Figure 5 about here)
The transition probability matrix is estimated to be
=
⎛
⎝ 11 12
21 22
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ 0919 0081
0028 0972
⎞
⎠ 
which means the low volatility regime is more persistent than in high volatility regime.
The matrix 0 measuring the contemporaneous relationship between variables for the
single-regime model is estimated to be
0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
05451 1 0
02829 03407 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
Similar to the case of REIT returns, the contemporaneous eﬀect of the spread on housing
market returns (03407%) is higher than that of federal funds rate on housing market
returns (02829%).
As for the regime switching model,
0(1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
06024 1 0
02118 03167 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  0(2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0
03746 1 0
03431 02252 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
Note that the contemporaneous eﬀect of the spread on housing market returns (03167%)
is higher than that of federal funds rate on housing market returns (02118%) in the high
volatility regime, but the opposite occurs in the low volatility regime. This exhibits a
similar pattern to the case of REIT returns. The diﬀerence is that the contemporaneous
23Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the literature on the 1987 stock market crash.
Among others, see Schwert (1990).
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eﬀect on REIT returns, either from federal funds rate or the spread, is much larger than
the eﬀect on housing market returns.
Figure 6 shows the impulse response of the  (2) model. As before, the solid
line represents results from single regime model, and two dotted lines represent results
when the economy is in regime 1 (high volatility), and regime 2 (low volatility). Several
interesting observations are in order. First, the impulse responses of housing market
returns to either federal funds rate or the spread are smaller in value but much more
persistent than the responses of REIT returns. This seems to be sensible as REIT is
being traded in a centralized market (“exchange”) while housing units are traded in a
very decentralized manner, through search and bargaining. Hence, policy would have
more persistent eﬀect in the housing market. Second, in response to an innovation in
federal funds rate, the responses of housing market returns in regime 1 and 2 are very
diﬀerent from those of REIT returns. In particular, recall that Figure 4 shows that REIT
returns decline much more substantially in regime 1 than in regime 2. But in Figure 6
the responses of housing market returns exhibits a pattern opposite to those of REIT
returns. Interestingly, the impulse response of the housing return to its own innovation
during the regime 1 eﬀectively dies out after 6 quarters, while the same response under
regime 2 lasts more than 20 quarters.
(Figure 6 about here)
4 Counterfactual Analysis
The results in the previous sections reveal that the monetary shock aﬀect the real estate
returns (REIT and housing) through two channels. On top of the “direct channel”
(from FFR directly to REIT or from FFR directly to HRET), a monetary policy change
would also aﬀect the term spread SPR, which in turn aﬀect the real estate returns (the
“indirect channel”). To assess the relative importance of the direct versus the indirect
channels, we conduct a counterfactual analysis by shutting oﬀ the eﬀect of the spread
on returns. Specifically, we set to zeros both the contemporaneous response of returns
to spread, 230 () in (1), as well as any lagged response of returns to spread given by
23 (),  = 1 for responses of REITs and  = 1 2 for housing returns in (1) which
govern the influence of lagged spreads on returns, fixing the covariance matrix of the
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structural errors  at its baseline value. Since we focus on the impulse response of an
innovation of the FFR, freezing all other shocks to be zero throughout the experiment,
this counterfactual exercise eﬀectively eliminates the marginal impact of spread on returns
(REITs and HRET, respectively) and highlight the direct channel only.
Figure 7 and 8 show that the impulse responses of returns on REITs and housing
market returns, respectively, to innovations of the federal funds rate with and without
shutting oﬀ the spread channel. Figure 7 shows that shutting oﬀ the spread channel to
REIT returns dwarfs the impact on the response of REIT returns to a federal funds rate
shock both in terms of magnitude and persistence, whether under the single-regime or
two-regime econometric model. The means that interest rate spread amplifies the eﬀect
of monetary policy on the REIT returns.
(Figure 7, 8 about here)
The case for the housing return is very diﬀerent. Figure 8 shows that the response to
the federal funds rate in regime 1 exhibits a volatility several times larger than the case
when the spread channel is shut oﬀ. This suggests that the spread dampens the eﬀect
of monetary policy on housing market returns particularly in the high volatility regime.
In regime 2, however, the eﬀect is diﬀerent. The impulse response with the full eﬀect
exhibits almost like a cycle for more than 20 quarters. With the spread channel shut
oﬀ, the response becomes smaller but also more persistent. This demonstrates that the
spread plays a very diﬀerent role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
aﬀecting diﬀerent asset returns and also under diﬀerent regimes.
What is the intuition behind this result? It may reflect the diﬀerence in financing of
the housing and REIT market. First of all, when the short-term rate decreases following
an expansionary monetary policy, the stimulation on the aggregate demand will raise
both returns of housing and REITs. Then, as discussed in the introduction, the rise in
the long run inflation expectation due to the expansionary monetary policy will push up
the long rate, leading the interest rate spread to increase. The rises in the long term
rate and the spread tend to suppress house prices due to a higher discount rate, or a
higher borrowing cost. This is because many households in the United States finance the
mortgage with a 30-year fixed rate mortgage (we will get back to this point later). Hence,
an increase in the term structure directly translate into an increase in the financing cost.
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Therefore, the spread appears as a stabilizer for the housing returns.
On the other hand, since underlying assets of equity REITs are mostly commercial
real estates, the returns would be more sensitive to business cycle. It is possible that the
potential customers (i.e. renters) of those commercial real estate are heavily dependent
on the short term rolling-over loan for finance, which would have significant eﬀect on
their business scale, including the amount of commercial real estate rental. Therefore,
an expansionary monetary policy not only leads to a decrease in the short rate, but may
also encourage them to switch to a higher proportion of short term financing, which tend
to make them even more sensitive to further changes in the short rate in the future. And
as discussed earlier, the literature finds that an upward yield curve tends to be associated
with a rise in economic prospect. Therefore, this further stimulates the returns of REITs
and thus the spread acts as an amplifier.
4.1 Robustness Check
Recall that the benchmark econometric model concerns only the interactions among asset
returns. It may be justified on the ground that asset markets in general adjust faster
than the real economy.24 On the other hand, it is sensible to ask whether the addi-
tional consideration of some macroeconomic variable will alter the results. For instance,
changes in monetary policy would aﬀect output which then feedbacks to the asset re-
turns, and therefore we have to control for the eﬀect of monetary policy on output in
order to characterize the behavior of REIT and housing market returns. In addition, real
estate returns are linked to the macroeconomy and business conditions (Ling and Naranjo
(1997), Liu and Mei (1992)), and term spread has been identified to have considerable
predictive power on future economic activity (Laurent (1988), Fama and French (1989),
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella (2005), Rosenberg and Maurer (2008)).25 How-
24Among others, see Dornbusch (1976) for an illustration.
25For example, Rosenberg and Maurer (2008) confirm term spread to be a leading indicator of reces-
sion, and the expectations component, rather than term premium, of the term spread is important in
explaining the role of term spread in predicting recession. Laurent (1988) uses the yield curve as an
indicator of monetary policy, and finds it statistically associated with the subsequent pace of output
growth. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find that the yield curve performed well in predicting aggregate
GNP, consumption, investment, and recessions.
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ever, due to complexity of our model, adding more variables would significantly increase
the number of parameters to be estimated. Therefore, we can only consider four-variate
models to check the robustness of our results. Since aggregate consumption is well known
to be “too smooth” to explain asset returns,26 we return to the real output for our ro-
bustness check. Specifically, we estimate the models ( ) and
( ) following the procedure outlined above, where  repre-
sents the growth rate of the aggregate output in real terms.27
Figure 9 and 11 presents the identified regimes for the four-variate models. As shown
in Figure 9, the four-variate model identifies the regime 1 (high volatility regime) with
only one quarter lead when compared with the three-variate model for REIT returns.
The high volatility regime accounts for 2045% of the total sample periods, identical to
the three-variate model. For the housing market returns in Figure 11, the high volatility
regime accounts for 1893% of the total sample periods, only a little bit lower than that
in the three-variate model.
(Figure 9, 10 about here)
The patterns of impulse responses in Figure 10 and 12 are also very similar to the
three-variate models in Figure 4 and 6, for the response of REIT and HRET respectively
to a change in federal funds rate. Furthermore, the patterns of impulse responses after
shutting oﬀ the eﬀect of spread are also very similar between the 3-variate and 4-variate
models, we thus omit the figures to save space.28 In sum, all of our results remain intact
when GDP is added to our three-variate model.
(Figure 11, 12 about here)
26There is a large empirical literature behind this fact. Among others, see Cochrane (2001, 2005) for
a review.
27Notice that real GDP is non-stationary. Thus, we follow the literature to use the real GDP growth
as the additional variable in our regression. Due to the space limit, here we present only figures of
identified regimes and impulse responses. The estimated results of parameter values for these two models
are omitted to save space. They are available upon request. Furthermore, a caveat for estimating the
model with housing market returns ( ) is that the AIC determines the model
to have two lags, as in the three-variate model; however, with two lags the total number of parameters
to be estimated amounts to 94. We therefore allows only one lag while estimating this model.
28The results will be available upon request.
22
To further strengthen our results, we repeat our counterfactual analysis. Figure 13
compares the impulse responses of REIT to innovations in FFR under three diﬀerent
scenarios: the full eﬀect, the case when the SPR channel is shut oﬀ, and the case when
the GDP channel is shut oﬀ. It is clear that in the case of single regime, the case when
the GDP channel is shut oﬀ is remarkably similar to the case of the full eﬀect. In fact,
for the case of regime 2 (low volatility regime), the two impulse responses are so similar
that the diﬀerence is almost invisible. On the other hand, it is still true that SPR acts
as an amplifier, as the impulse response of the case when the SPR channel being shut oﬀ
has a small magnitude and is less persistent.
(Figure 13, 14 about here)
We repeat the same exercise on housing return and report the results in figure 14.
Again, for both the single regime case as well as the case of regime 2, the two impulse
responses (the full eﬀect and the case when the GDP channel is shut oﬀ) are very sim-
ilar. The results on the REIT return and the housing return confirm the intuition that
asset market adjust faster than the real economy (or being more “forward-looking”) and
therefore the impulse responses to the innovation of monetary policy are very similar
with and without the GDP.29
When we allow for regime-switching, we confirm an earlier finding. Under regime
1, the impulse response of HRET when the SPR channel is shut oﬀ exhibits a level of
volatility which is at least 3 times of the case when the GDP channel is shut oﬀ, and is
at least 9 times for the full eﬀect. In other words, the interest rate spread does serve as
a stabilizer under the high volatility regime, even after the eﬀect of GDP is also taken
into considerations.
29It does not mean that GDP is unimportant. For instance, Telmer and Zin (2002) find that in a
dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete financial market, pricing kernels that are simple
functions of equilibrium prices (or returns), provide good proxies for ‘actual’ pricing kernels that are
typically higher dimensional functions of disaggregate information. Thus, a structural asset pricing model
with a strong theoretical base can be consistent with reduced-form specifications which, in practice, tend
to ‘perform’ better.
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5 Comparison with the stock return
Earlier literature on the REIT such as Glascock et al. (2002), Chan et al. (2005),
find that REIT behave more like stocks and less like bonds after early 1990s. With a
slightly updated dataset and with a very diﬀerent econometric tool, it may be interesting
to compare the behavior of the stock return and to confirm whether REIT is indeed
like stock. To address these concerns, we use the S&P 500 index from Datastream
and estimate a series of models. The first one is (  ) where 
represents the stock returns. It is exactly our basic model discussed earlier, with real
estate return replaced by stock return. Due to the space limit, we can again only report
the results graphically and the details are available upon request. Figure 15 shows that
for the stock return, the high volatility regime occurs basically in the late 1970s and early
1980s, which is similar to that of REIT. Figure 16 shows the impulse responses of stock
return to diﬀerent innovations. It seems to suggest that in the face of the innovations
of FFR and the stock return itself, the impulse responses tend to have a large initial
reaction but then die out pretty quickly. This pattern of stock return, again, is similar
to that of REIT.
(Figure 15, 16, 17 about here)
We also conduct the counterfactual analysis to compare the full eﬀect and the case
when the interest rate spread channel is shut oﬀ. Perhaps surprisingly, figure 17 shows
that the diﬀerence between the two cases is very small, implying that the spread plays
almost no role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. On this regard, stock
return is very diﬀerent from both REIT and housing return.
To complete the comparison, we estimate a second model, which is (  )
In other words, we attempt to provide a robustness check for the results of the stock re-
turn. Figure 18 shows that the introduction of the GDP into the dynamical system does
not significantly aﬀect our identification of the regimes. The diﬀerence between figure 15
and 18 are very minor. Figure 19 displays the impulse responses of the stock return for
diﬀerent types of innovation.
(Figure 18, 19, 20 about here)
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Again, we conduct the counterfactual analysis of shutting down a certain channel and
compare those impulse response with that of the full eﬀect. Figure 20 shows that whether
shutting oﬀ the spread or the GDP channel makes very little diﬀerence under all regimes.
The implications are clear. As in the case of REIT and housing, the introduction of GDP
is not important. It also confirms the finding that the spread does not play any role of
the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the impact of changes in the main monetary policy instrument
in the United States, the Federal Funds Rate, on Equity REITs, housing, and stock
returns respectively, to study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the
asset markets. The relatively superior performance of the econometric model with all
parameters being regime-dependent suggests a strong non-linearity in the response of
asset returns (equity REIT returns and housing market returns) to federal funds rate
and the interest rate spread. We also find that, in response to either federal funds
rate or the spread, housing market returns react less significantly but more persistently
than REIT returns. Furthermore, the dynamics of housing market returns between the
high and the low regimes are very diﬀerent from those of REIT returns. Finally, the
interest rate spread seems to amplify the eﬀect on REIT returns but dampen the eﬀect
on housing market returns in response to an innovation of the federal funds rate. In sharp
contrast, the interest rate spread plays virtually no role in transmitting monetary shock
to the stock return. These results seem to suggest that diﬀerent assets indeed behave
very diﬀerently and that monetary policy can at the same time stabilize and de-stabilize
diﬀerent segments of the real estate market. Thus, policy makers may need to be very
careful in using monetary policy that aims to stabilize the real state market.
In addition, we find that the introduction of the real GDP growth have little impact
on the estimation, confirming the notion that asset markets tend to adjust much faster,
or being more “forward looking” than the real economy. We also confirm the earlier
findings that in some aspects, the stock return and the REIT return are similar. On the
other hand, we find that the interest rate spread plays almost no role in the transmission
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mechanism of monetary policy for the stock return, which is very diﬀerent from both
REIT and housing.
Clearly, this paper have several limitations and can be extended in several ways. First,
we have followed the monetary policy literature (survey by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 1999) in the identification of shocks. More specifically, we have assumed that
the monetary policy reacts to the asset market only with a time lag. This may not be
true. In the appendix, we study an alternative hypothesis suggested to us. Although
we have not found any supporting evidence for that hypothesis, we still can not rule
other possibilities. Moreover, if the central bank has an objective function and actively
responds to the situation of the economy and the asset markets, the current framework
may be inadequate. One may consider to follow the footsteps of Sargent, Williams
and Zha (2006), among others, to adopt a Bayesian learning framework to model the
interactions among the policy maker, the real economy and the asset markets.
Second, our current approach has assumed that there are only two regimes, replacing
each other stochastically throughout the whole sampling period. One may argue that
there could be a third regime. In particular, the increasing securitization and leveraging
in the period 2000˜2005 may diﬀer from all previous periods. Unfortunately, we do not
have enough data points to estimate a 3-regime structural VAR model and whether it
out-performs the current 2-regime counterpart. Furthermore, the period 2000˜2005 is
simply too short to estimate a linear VAR model. In the appendix, we can only estimate
an “extended period,” namely, from year 2000 to 2008 and we find that the impulse
responses during that sub-period in fact behaves diﬀerently from the whole sample. At
this point, we can only await future research to have a more throughout investigation
of the possibility of introducing yet another regime, or to adopt a better econometric
framework and longer time series that would be available.
In terms of extension, the current study focuses on the aggregate data and the future
research can naturally switch to the analysis to the micro-data. Recall that the finding
that interest rate spread amplifies the eﬀect of monetary policy on the REIT returns, and
yet dampens the eﬀect of monetary policy on housing market returns in high the volatility
regime. Thus, a possible extension of this study is to repeat the analysis on firm-level
data. We can then verify whether such “amplifying eﬀect” appears in all REIT, or REIT
listed in a certain period of time, or REIT with certain characteristics. In addition, the
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analysis here can be applied to other countries and verify whether the results from the
U.S. data can be generalized. Researchers can also await for longer time series and then
introduce more control variables, as well as additional features of the regime switching
model, such as time-dependent switching probabilities. Moreover, the empirical work
here also provide some “stylized facts” relating the monetary policy, term structure,
housing return and stock return. These facts have yet to be modelled in existing dynamic
equilibrium models, and should hence leave a challenge to the theorists.30
30Among others, see Emiris (2006), Leung and Teo (2008), and the reference therein.
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Figure 1 Market Capitalization of Various Types of REITs as a Ratio to Total REITs
Figure 2 Percentage Changes in Federal Funds Rate (FFR), Interest Rate Spread
(SPR), Equity REIT Returns (REIT), and Housing Market Returns (HRET)
Figure 3 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, REIT)
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Figure 5 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(2) Model of (FFR, SPR, HRET)
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Figure 9 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, GDP, REIT)
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Figure 11 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, GDP, HRET)
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Figure 15 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, SRET)
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Figure 18 Smoothed Probabilities for SVAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, GDP, SRET)
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Table 1 Statistical Summary of Federal Funds Rate, Interest Rate Spread, Housing
Market Returns, and Equity REIT Returns (1975Q2-2008Q1)
FFR SPR HRET REIT
Mean 6.464 1.490 1.401 1.519
Median 5.618 1.581 1.345 1.852
Maximum 17.780 3.611 4.425 18.523
Minimum 0.997 −2.182 −0.406 −18.174
Std. Dev. 3.493 1.341 0.947 6.849
Skewness 1.040 −0.604 0.564 −0.182
Kurtosis 4.307 2.904 3.284 3.173
Observations 132.000 132.000 132.000 132.000
Note: FFR denotes the federal funds rate, SPR denotes interest rate spread, HRET means
housing market returns, and REIT means equity REIT returns.
Table 2 Correlation Coefficients (1975Q2-2008Q1)
FFR SPR HRET REIT
FFR 1.000
SPR −0.554 1.000
HRET −0.055 −0.101 1.000
REIT −0.108 0.146 0.211 1.000
Table 3 AIC Values for Various Three-Variable VAR(p) Models
VAR Model What Are State-Contingent p=1
Single-Regime Model None 10.625
2-Regime Model (A) c(st),3(st) 9.951
2-Regime Model (B) c(st),3(st), vt(st) 9.928
2-Regime Model (C) c(st),3(st),8k(st) 9.945
2-Regime Model (D) c(st),3(st),8k(st), vt(st) 9.916
Note: The three variables are FFR, SPR, and REIT.
Table 4 LM tests of Autocorrelation for VAR(1) Model of (FFR, SPR, REIT)
k Single-Regime Model Model D (Two-Regime Model)
3 7.549 12.029
6 9.794 11.098
9 7.809 12.122
Note: The null hypothesis of LM test is that there is no autocorrelation for residuals
up to order k. The statistic follows the χ2 distribution with 9 degrees of freedom. The
value of χ2 distribution with 9 degrees of freedom at 5% significance level is 16.919.
Table 5 The Estimation Results for (FFR, SPR, REIT)
VAR Model Markov Switching Model (Model D)
Single Regime Regime 1 Regime 2
Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
c1 0.302 0.334 3.767** 1.507 3.767** 1.507
α1(2) −3.761** 1.600
φ
(11)
1 0.957*** 0.047 0.690*** 0.113 0.977*** 0.045
φ
(12)
1 −0.060 0.075 −0.457** 0.192 0.036 0.047
φ
(13)
1 0.030** 0.012 0.094** 0.043 0.007 0.008
σ 21 0.923*** 0.298 2.659** 1.208 2.659** 1.208
λ1(2) 0.301*** 0.066
c2 0.077 0.216 −1.302 0.895 −1.302 0.895
α2(2) 1.578* 0.956
φ
(21)
1 0.015 0.030 0.132* 0.068 −0.021 0.034
φ
(22)
1 0.903*** 0.049 1.013*** 0.116 0.896*** 0.044
φ
(23)
1 −0.019** 0.008 −0.077*** 0.026 −0.003 0.006
σ 22 0.425*** 0.099 0.902*** 0.326 0.902*** 0.902
λ2(2) 0.474*** 0.088
c3 −0.740 3.074 6.537 8.206 6.537 8.206
α3(2) −5.319 8.702
φ
(31)
1 0.098 0.317 −0.395 0.668 −0.258 0.395
φ
(32)
1 1.083 0.659 0.939 0.855 0.840 0.651
φ
(33)
1 0.007 0.078 −0.086 0.177 −0.012 0.039
σ 23 44.874*** 5.671 36.089*** 6.093 36.089*** 6.093
λ3(2) 1.127 0.127
r12 −0.782*** 0.066 −0.846*** 0.081 −0.652*** 0.073
r13 −0.148** 0.072 −0.380*** 0.148 −0.132 0.103
r23 −0.033 0.079 0.074 0.203 −0.075 0.108
P11 0.956*** (0.030)
P22 0.991*** (0.007)
ln L -683.219 -616.436
Note: Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. *, **, and *** represent the significance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Moreover, the null hypothesis for scale parameter is λi (2) = 1.
Table 6 AIC Values for Various Three-Variable VAR(p) Models
VAR Model p=1 p=2
Single-Regime Model 6.120 6.084
Model A (Two-Regime Model) 5.403 5.059
Model B (Two-Regime Model) 5.402 4.972
Model C (Two-Regime Model) 6.330 4.907
Model D (Two-Regime Model) 5.308 4.781
Note: The three variables are FFR, SPR, and HRET.
Table 7 LM tests for Autocorrelation for VAR(p) Model of (FFR, SPR, HRET)
k Single-Regime Model Model D (Two-Regime Model)
p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2
3 11.784 13.238 10.755 5.550
6 20.819 14.992 21.362 15.476
9 5.933 7.648 6.633 6.606
Note: The null hypothesis of LM test is that there is no autocorrelation for residuals up
to order k. The statistic follows the χ2 distribution with 9s of freedom. The value of χ2
distribution with 9 degrees of freedom at 5% significance level is 16.919.
Table 8 The Estimation Results for (FFR, SPR, HRET)
VAR Model Markov Switching Model (Model D)
Single Regime Regime 1 Regime 2
Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
c1 −0.360 0.332 −0.535 1.606 −0.535 1.606
α1(2) 0.136 1.593
φ
(11)
1 1.068*** 0.215 0.662* 0.385 1.763*** 0.142
φ
(12)
1 −0.095 0.205 −0.556 0.458 0.320** 0.143
φ
(13)
1 0.377** 0.167 1.145* 0.667 0.070 0.059
φ
(11)
2 −0.092 0.226 0.260 0.356 −0.754*** 0.144
φ
(12)
2 0.145 0.210 0.554 0.422 −0.219 0.149
φ
(13)
2 −0.084 0.115 −0.016 0.270 0.074 0.064
σ 21 0.836*** 0.287 2.343*** 0.664 2.343*** 0.664
λ1(2) 0.218*** 0.030
c2 0.483** 0.224 1.648 1.161 1.648 1.161
α2(2) −1.098 1.152
φ
(21)
1 0.129 0.138 0.323 0.261 −0.558*** 0.086
φ
(22)
1 1.127*** 0.138 1.170*** 0.310 0.930*** 0.092
φ
(23)
1 −0.117 0.103 −0.381 0.353 −0.014 0.049
φ
(21)
2 −0.128 0.139 −0.358 0.247 0.511*** 0.080
φ
(22)
2 −0.280** 0.136 −0.442 0.305 −0.108 0.090
φ
(23)
2 −0.065 0.077 −0.270 0.200 −0.042 0.050
σ 22 0.401*** 0.093 1.050*** 0.361 1.050*** 0.361
λ2(2) 0.290*** 0.055
(continued next page)
Table 8 The Estimation Results for (FFR, SPR, HRET) (Continued)
VAR Model Markov Switching Model (Model D)
Single Regime Regime 1 Regime 2
Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
c3 0.242 0.212 3.619*** 1.544 3.619*** 1.544
α3(2) −3.602** 1.517
φ
(31)
1 −0.052 0.107 −0.228 0.187 0.158 0.185
φ
(32)
1 −0.078 0.168 −0.351 0.242 0.011 0.171
φ
(33)
1 0.486*** 0.098 −0.193 0.161 0.600*** 0.100
φ
(31)
2 0.052 0.115 0.076 0.191 −0.140 0.180
φ
(32)
2 0.151 0.163 −0.048 0.269 0.118 0.145
φ
(33)
2 0.256*** 0.086 −0.075 0.276 0.184** 0.084
σ 23 0.483*** 0.067 0.464*** 0.152 0.464*** 0.152
λ3(2) 0.917 0.190
r12 −0.787*** 0.062 −0.900*** 0.138 −0.420*** 0.108
r13 −0.128 0.178 −0.047 0.818 −0.138 0.147
r23 −0.018 0.181 −0.048 0.723 −0.030 0.145
P11 0.919*** (0.085)
P22 0.972*** (0.039)
ln L -374.572 -259.535
Note: Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. *, **, and *** represent the significance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Moreover, the null hypotheis for scale parameter is λi (2) = 1.
APPENDIX
This appendix attempts to address the concerns of some alternative interpretation of
the model as well as the data.
First, it has been suggested to us that
“But one story is: when the economy is booming, income are high, and households
are more likely to be able to finance the purchase of housing. This raises the liquidity of
housing. When housing is more liquid, many people are willing to be buyers and sellers.
As a result, more transactions take place. But as more transactions take place, lenders
charge lower interest rates. . . The lower interest rate spread causes even more buyers to
enter the market, reinforcing the greater liquidity and causing prices to rise. But, as I
understand it, a transmission mechanism of this sort is ruled out by the authors by the
way in which the VAR is specified. . . ”
We are very grateful to this suggestion. Yet when we try to test this alternative
hypothesis, we face some diﬃculty. We lack measures of the housing market liquidity as
well as transaction volume of the housing market for the same sampling period. Thus,
we can only look at a “reduced form” of the hypothesis, which is a negative correlation
between the income (or GDP) and the term spread (SPR). Below is what we find:
(Table A1, A2 about here)
Please allow us to explain. We first study the correlation between the GDP (i.e. GDP
growth rate, as the level is non-stationary) and the term spread for the full sampling
period. The correlation seems to be very small (0.152 as shown in the first row of table
A1). We then use our regime-switching VAR model to identify the periods in which the
economy is in “regime 1” (i.e. the high volatility regime) and the periods in which the
economy is in “regime 2.” We then divide the sample into 2 sub-samples: the “regime
1 sub-sample” and the “regime 2 sub-sample.” We compute the correlation between the
two variables for each of these sub-samples. Again, the correlations are small (0.156 and
0.151).
One can argue that while the (unconditional) correlation is low, the conditional cor-
relation (or “partial correlation” can be high). To investigate such a possibility, we run
a regression of GDP on the FFR and HRET first, and get the residual term u(t) as the
“conditional GDP growth” (please see table A2 for more details). We then compute the
correlations between the “conditional GDP growth” and the SPR under the full sample,
the regime 1 subsample and the regime 2 subsamples. The results are shown in the sec-
ond row of table A1. Again, the correlations are very low. Thus, given our very limited
proxies, we have not been able to find evidence to support this alternative theory.
Clearly, a key variable, the transaction volume variable, is missing. We would re-visit
this issue in our ongoing research with a diﬀerent dataset and hopefully we will be able
to deliver a more satisfactory answer in the future.
Second, in terms of the identification restriction, it is the same one used in the mon-
etary policy literature (among others, see the survey by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1999). It actually allows the real estate return to aﬀect the FFR and SPR with
time lags. The only restriction is that the eﬀect is one-directional contemporaneously.
For less restrictive identification assumption, one needs to adopt the Bayesian methodol-
ogy (see Leeper, Sims and Zha, 1996, for more elaborations). Our impression is that while
some researchers welcome the Bayesian method, some seem to have reservations. There-
fore, we attempt to pursue with the “classical econometrics” method (which may be less
controversial) and hence inevitably adopt the currently used identification assumption.
Third, there is a suggestion concerning the financial intermediation.
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“Further, is the potential for adverse selection so much greater in the housing market
relative to the REIT market, thereby explaining why house prices are less significantly
but more persistently impacted by changes in monetary policy than are REIT returns?”
This is a very interesting suggestion. Without the corresponding micro-level data, we
are unable to make much progress for this hypothesis though. We only have a simple
observation at this point, which is that adverse selection could lead a market to shrink, as
in the case of “Lemon” in the classical paper of Akerlof (1970). Yet the mortgage market
actually expands between year 2000 and 2005. Why did not the financial intermediations
further ration the credit when the adverse selection problem became more severe? Thus,
it seems that a more complete theory demands not only the adverse selection of the
residential mortgage demand, but also the supply, i.e. the behavior of the financial
intermediaries. We are currently working towards that direction. Again, we are very
grateful to this inspiring insight.
The fourth concern is related to the recent crisis.
“Given that the originate-to-securitize process had unintended consequences in the US
housing market during the 2000-2005 period, do we really expect the eﬀects of monetary
policy to be same across the authors’ entire sample period?”
Again, this is a very good point. Unfortunately, even when we restrict the attention
to the single regime (i.e. linear) VAR model with 4 variables, we find that we need to
estimate 96 parameters with 6 years of data (for the parameters in the dynamic equation
as well as the variance-covariance matrix), which is insuﬃcient! Thus, we extend the
period to 2000-2008, which is barely enough for the estimation of a linear 4-variate VAR
model. Needless to say, since the model in the paper is a regime-switching VAR model
with much longer time series, the results may not be directly comparable. Figure A1
provides a visualization of the impulse responses. In the case of REIT (the left hand
side), it is clear that the 2000-2008 sub-sample are very diﬀerent. For the “full sample”
case, or the periods under regime 1, or those under regime 2, a positive innovation of FFR
will lead to a drop in the REIT return. It seems natural as an increase in the interest rate
tends to depress asset returns. In fact, it is also what happened to the housing return
(HRET) and the stock return (SRET).
(figure A1 about here)
However, for the 2000-2008 sub-sample, the initial response is an increase in the REIT
return, followed by a decrease, even when the GDP is controlled. In fact, it is clear that
it is also the case for housing return (HRET) and stock return (SRET). So, the 2000-2008
period is indeed “abnormal.” How can this happen? At this point, the only explanation
we can provide is a “signaling type story.” Assume that the central bank wants to prevent
the market from “over-heating.” And assume that people believe that the central bank
has some private information about the future economic growth. In that case, when an
increase in the interest rate is a signal that the economy will grow even more in the
future, and this stimulates even more investment in all assets, and lead to an increase in
the returns. When the people discover that it is not the case, investors are disappointed
and the asset returns over-shoot (in this case, drop below the steady state value).
Clearly, this “explanation” is very preliminary and we hope that our future research
can address this issue in a more satisfactory manner.
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Table A1: The Correlation Coefficient between GDP growth and SPR 
(The regimes are classified by model of (FFR, SPR, HRET)) 
 
 
Table A2: The Estimates Results for Simple Regression 
 Full Sample Regime 1 Regime 2 
0a  0.837*** 
(0.173) 
2.064*** 
(0.730) 
0.640*** 
(0.170) 
1a  -0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.102* 
(0.056) 
-0.005 
(0.026) 
2a  0.062 
(0.069) 
-0.184 
(0.273) 
0.104* 
(0.061) 
Note: The simple regression is 0 1 2GDP FFR HRET ta a a u    . Values in 
parenthesis are standard deviations. 
 
 Full Sample Regime 1 Regime 2 
Correlation 
(GDP,SPR)  
0.152 0.156 0.151 
Conditional 
Correlation 
( ,SPR)tu  
0.098 -0.144 0.159 
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